dk_dunkirk wrote: »Hi,
I'm a Linux Systems Engineer, by profession, and I have been through a colo-wide Emergency Power Off event in my time.
Let me tell you, it's not as simple as just turning stuff back on...
- Our colocation center ITSELF was supposed to be our UPS. There's no UPS. If the colo goes out, that's it.
- when power was cutoff, it didn't take us long to figure out that the colo.. disappeared. We basically clown-car'd over to the datacenter and we were there for a long time. The power failure had occured in the early evening, on a Friday, and we spent all night there. We were 5 staff members that rushed over.
- when the power came back, ALL of the machines all tried to POST and boot at the same time. I don't know if you've ever heard servers, but their fans scream and everything goes full power for a sec. There was a brownout and 2/3 of the hosts were stuck in POST, frozen. Someone had to go around with a crashcart/KVM to check on its health and force a powercycle. 1 host at a time. There can be a LOT of hosts in a colo.
- our disaster recovery plan never had a 'cold start' plan prepared and we had to make one up on the fly. The switches will just power on and everything needs to be up. Storage, Database, and caching hosts first. Tools and things that talk to storage hosts next. (workhorse hosts, website). Once that's up and healthy, Proxies come up next, opening the floodgates to services.
- many the database hosts had corrupted tables that needed SQL table repair after boot. I saw in another thread that there are indeed MySQL hosts involved, so they have my sympathy there. *1000 yards stare*
- Some hosts were DOA and wouldnt even power on. Sometimes it was a standby of a given role, so we just let them stay dead till we had time for a replacement. Others were Primaries, and we had to force emergency failovers and make sure the old dead primaries stayed dead and don't just come back to life to mess things up. That led to some things being out a sync a bit after revival.
Anyway, we worked all weekend. We had standby hosts to revive or replace and a lot of cleanup to do to damaged databases that we had to prioritize.
When we walked in the office door on Monday, the office staff stood up and gave us a standing ovation.
As someone who helped bring a data center online, I don't understand ANY of this. We had redundant EVERYTHING except main power feeds (because of local zoning). Even redundant ISP's and physical drops. We tested our generators and our UPS's and cooling towers monthly. I don't get it. A colo facility that even HAS an "edge case" scenario is not one I'd trust a million dollar a year business to.
It sounds to me like the system that cuts everything out to prevent loss due to water damage kicked in. The one where "welp it's better to shut down unexpectedly rather than short out" comes into play. Basically where you don't WANT backup power to kick in.
Hi,
I'm a Linux Systems Engineer, by profession, and I have been through a colo-wide Emergency Power Off event in my time.
Let me tell you, it's not as simple as just turning stuff back on...
- Our colocation center ITSELF was supposed to be our UPS. There's no UPS. If the colo goes out, that's it.
- when power was cutoff, it didn't take us long to figure out that the colo.. disappeared. We basically clown-car'd over to the datacenter and we were there for a long time. The power failure had occured in the early evening, on a Friday, and we spent all night there. We were 5 staff members that rushed over.
- when the power came back, ALL of the machines all tried to POST and boot at the same time. I don't know if you've ever heard servers, but their fans scream and everything goes full power for a sec. There was a brownout and 2/3 of the hosts were stuck in POST, frozen. Someone had to go around with a crashcart/KVM to check on its health and force a powercycle. 1 host at a time. There can be a LOT of hosts in a colo.
- our disaster recovery plan never had a 'cold start' plan prepared and we had to make one up on the fly. The switches will just power on and everything needs to be up. Storage, Database, and caching hosts first. Tools and things that talk to storage hosts next. (workhorse hosts, website). Once that's up and healthy, Proxies come up next, opening the floodgates to services.
- many the database hosts had corrupted tables that needed SQL table repair after boot. I saw in another thread that there are indeed MySQL hosts involved, so they have my sympathy there. *1000 yards stare*
- Some hosts were DOA and wouldnt even power on. Sometimes it was a standby of a given role, so we just let them stay dead till we had time for a replacement. Others were Primaries, and we had to force emergency failovers and make sure the old dead primaries stayed dead and don't just come back to life to mess things up. That led to some things being out a sync a bit after revival.
Anyway, we worked all weekend. We had standby hosts to revive or replace and a lot of cleanup to do to damaged databases that we had to prioritize.
When we walked in the office door on Monday, the office staff stood up and gave us a standing ovation.
I don't understand how one power cut can take out both the NA and EU servers. Isn't the point of having different regional servers that they're in different physical locations, to improve the connection for people in that continent?
The login server is located in the same data center as the NA servers, and it serves both NA and EU.
EU PC 2000+ CP professional mudballer and pie thrower"Sheggorath, you are the Skooma Cat, for what is crazier than a cat on skooma?" - Fadomai
dk_dunkirk wrote: »dk_dunkirk wrote: »Hi,
I'm a Linux Systems Engineer, by profession, and I have been through a colo-wide Emergency Power Off event in my time.
Let me tell you, it's not as simple as just turning stuff back on...
- Our colocation center ITSELF was supposed to be our UPS. There's no UPS. If the colo goes out, that's it.
- when power was cutoff, it didn't take us long to figure out that the colo.. disappeared. We basically clown-car'd over to the datacenter and we were there for a long time. The power failure had occured in the early evening, on a Friday, and we spent all night there. We were 5 staff members that rushed over.
- when the power came back, ALL of the machines all tried to POST and boot at the same time. I don't know if you've ever heard servers, but their fans scream and everything goes full power for a sec. There was a brownout and 2/3 of the hosts were stuck in POST, frozen. Someone had to go around with a crashcart/KVM to check on its health and force a powercycle. 1 host at a time. There can be a LOT of hosts in a colo.
- our disaster recovery plan never had a 'cold start' plan prepared and we had to make one up on the fly. The switches will just power on and everything needs to be up. Storage, Database, and caching hosts first. Tools and things that talk to storage hosts next. (workhorse hosts, website). Once that's up and healthy, Proxies come up next, opening the floodgates to services.
- many the database hosts had corrupted tables that needed SQL table repair after boot. I saw in another thread that there are indeed MySQL hosts involved, so they have my sympathy there. *1000 yards stare*
- Some hosts were DOA and wouldnt even power on. Sometimes it was a standby of a given role, so we just let them stay dead till we had time for a replacement. Others were Primaries, and we had to force emergency failovers and make sure the old dead primaries stayed dead and don't just come back to life to mess things up. That led to some things being out a sync a bit after revival.
Anyway, we worked all weekend. We had standby hosts to revive or replace and a lot of cleanup to do to damaged databases that we had to prioritize.
When we walked in the office door on Monday, the office staff stood up and gave us a standing ovation.
As someone who helped bring a data center online, I don't understand ANY of this. We had redundant EVERYTHING except main power feeds (because of local zoning). Even redundant ISP's and physical drops. We tested our generators and our UPS's and cooling towers monthly. I don't get it. A colo facility that even HAS an "edge case" scenario is not one I'd trust a million dollar a year business to.
It sounds to me like the system that cuts everything out to prevent loss due to water damage kicked in. The one where "welp it's better to shut down unexpectedly rather than short out" comes into play. Basically where you don't WANT backup power to kick in.
Wait. Where's the comment that there was a flood? I've been reading and hadn't seen that.
And why would a flood at a single facility take out BOTH the NA and EU "megaservers?" That doesn't make sense.
And "my" data center was purposely built higher than the 100-year flood plain. :-D
dk_dunkirk wrote: »As someone who helped bring a data center online, I don't understand ANY of this. We had redundant EVERYTHING except main power feeds (because of local zoning). Even redundant ISP's and physical drops. We tested our generators and our UPS's and cooling towers monthly. I don't get it. A colo facility that even HAS an "edge case" scenario is not one I'd trust a million dollar a year business to.
ZoS should extend the time of endeavours and login reward by 24 hours and give tomorrows login reward and seals of endeavours extra for free.
It is unavoidable that players are unable to play when the server are down but not OK to still expect players to login to get their daily reward and endeavour seals when the servers are down.
In germany/frankfurt where EU server is located it was 6pm when the server went down and they will not be up until after reset at 4am. Most Europeans are not playing before that time.
dk_dunkirk wrote: »As someone who helped bring a data center online, I don't understand ANY of this. We had redundant EVERYTHING except main power feeds (because of local zoning). Even redundant ISP's and physical drops. We tested our generators and our UPS's and cooling towers monthly. I don't get it. A colo facility that even HAS an "edge case" scenario is not one I'd trust a million dollar a year business to.
It was an EPO event. "Emergency Power Off". Someone pressed the "big red emergency" switch that is there by LAW.
It was a security guard. He had knocked over the cover over the switch. An alarm went off. He tried to put the cover back on. The alarm did not stop. He panicked.
Then he pressed the end-of-employment button.
Nightmare scenario over at Zeni right now.
From ZoSKevin:Hi all, just providing an update. We are still hard at work getting systems back online. Based on what we know right now, we believe the Megaservers will most likely be offline longer than the original 12 hour estimation. We hope to provide more clarity on timeframe once we have a little more time to complete more work.
Regarding the scope of work, this issue we ran into today was an edge-case emergency power outage at the data center that did not trigger standard backup failsafes for multiple tenants affected by the outage. (This type of outage is designed to cut ALL power in the event of a fire/flood scenario.) The outage now requires us to do a full reboot of our hardware while recovering from a full loss of power. Rebuilding piece by piece involves a methodical and lengthy process, including additional verification and testing as we bring the hardware online.
Hopefully this provides some clarity on the work happening right now. Thanks again for the continued patience.
The question for ZOS is going to be this... Was it worth cheaping out on having a backup data center incase of system failure for ANY reason and foregoing disaster recovery considering how beotchy gamers can be in terms of rage quitting or things even smaller than this and with an already shrinking player base? Will the cost of losing all that money outway the cost/chance you've taken to forego DR? I'll confess to telling my husband about this today and he can't wait to send a team over to offer services for DR.
It seems likely that the NA data center backs up to the EU data center and vice versa multiple times a day (or to some third party site but that would be more expensive). But you can't just flip a switch and make the game run there now, it doesn't work that way.
dk_dunkirk wrote: »dk_dunkirk wrote: »Hi,
I'm a Linux Systems Engineer, by profession, and I have been through a colo-wide Emergency Power Off event in my time.
Let me tell you, it's not as simple as just turning stuff back on...
- Our colocation center ITSELF was supposed to be our UPS. There's no UPS. If the colo goes out, that's it.
- when power was cutoff, it didn't take us long to figure out that the colo.. disappeared. We basically clown-car'd over to the datacenter and we were there for a long time. The power failure had occured in the early evening, on a Friday, and we spent all night there. We were 5 staff members that rushed over.
- when the power came back, ALL of the machines all tried to POST and boot at the same time. I don't know if you've ever heard servers, but their fans scream and everything goes full power for a sec. There was a brownout and 2/3 of the hosts were stuck in POST, frozen. Someone had to go around with a crashcart/KVM to check on its health and force a powercycle. 1 host at a time. There can be a LOT of hosts in a colo.
- our disaster recovery plan never had a 'cold start' plan prepared and we had to make one up on the fly. The switches will just power on and everything needs to be up. Storage, Database, and caching hosts first. Tools and things that talk to storage hosts next. (workhorse hosts, website). Once that's up and healthy, Proxies come up next, opening the floodgates to services.
- many the database hosts had corrupted tables that needed SQL table repair after boot. I saw in another thread that there are indeed MySQL hosts involved, so they have my sympathy there. *1000 yards stare*
- Some hosts were DOA and wouldnt even power on. Sometimes it was a standby of a given role, so we just let them stay dead till we had time for a replacement. Others were Primaries, and we had to force emergency failovers and make sure the old dead primaries stayed dead and don't just come back to life to mess things up. That led to some things being out a sync a bit after revival.
Anyway, we worked all weekend. We had standby hosts to revive or replace and a lot of cleanup to do to damaged databases that we had to prioritize.
When we walked in the office door on Monday, the office staff stood up and gave us a standing ovation.
As someone who helped bring a data center online, I don't understand ANY of this. We had redundant EVERYTHING except main power feeds (because of local zoning). Even redundant ISP's and physical drops. We tested our generators and our UPS's and cooling towers monthly. I don't get it. A colo facility that even HAS an "edge case" scenario is not one I'd trust a million dollar a year business to.
It sounds to me like the system that cuts everything out to prevent loss due to water damage kicked in. The one where "welp it's better to shut down unexpectedly rather than short out" comes into play. Basically where you don't WANT backup power to kick in.
Wait. Where's the comment that there was a flood? I've been reading and hadn't seen that.
And why would a flood at a single facility take out BOTH the NA and EU "megaservers?" That doesn't make sense.
And "my" data center was purposely built higher than the 100-year flood plain. :-D
They posted that the system that kicks in to totally knock out power in case of fire or flood is what kicked in. I don't think there was an actual flood. More a problem with the buildings emergency systems.
ArchangelIsraphel wrote: »It's also the point at which even more dishes seem to suddenly manifest in the sink out of no-where.
How do you know so accurately what happens in my home? That's almost scary!
dk_dunkirk wrote: »
Wait. Where's the comment that there was a flood? I've been reading and hadn't seen that.
And why would a flood at a single facility take out BOTH the NA and EU "megaservers?" That doesn't make sense.
And "my" data center was purposely built higher than the 100-year flood plain. :-D
dk_dunkirk wrote: »dk_dunkirk wrote: »dk_dunkirk wrote: »Hi,
I'm a Linux Systems Engineer, by profession, and I have been through a colo-wide Emergency Power Off event in my time.
Let me tell you, it's not as simple as just turning stuff back on...
- Our colocation center ITSELF was supposed to be our UPS. There's no UPS. If the colo goes out, that's it.
- when power was cutoff, it didn't take us long to figure out that the colo.. disappeared. We basically clown-car'd over to the datacenter and we were there for a long time. The power failure had occured in the early evening, on a Friday, and we spent all night there. We were 5 staff members that rushed over.
- when the power came back, ALL of the machines all tried to POST and boot at the same time. I don't know if you've ever heard servers, but their fans scream and everything goes full power for a sec. There was a brownout and 2/3 of the hosts were stuck in POST, frozen. Someone had to go around with a crashcart/KVM to check on its health and force a powercycle. 1 host at a time. There can be a LOT of hosts in a colo.
- our disaster recovery plan never had a 'cold start' plan prepared and we had to make one up on the fly. The switches will just power on and everything needs to be up. Storage, Database, and caching hosts first. Tools and things that talk to storage hosts next. (workhorse hosts, website). Once that's up and healthy, Proxies come up next, opening the floodgates to services.
- many the database hosts had corrupted tables that needed SQL table repair after boot. I saw in another thread that there are indeed MySQL hosts involved, so they have my sympathy there. *1000 yards stare*
- Some hosts were DOA and wouldnt even power on. Sometimes it was a standby of a given role, so we just let them stay dead till we had time for a replacement. Others were Primaries, and we had to force emergency failovers and make sure the old dead primaries stayed dead and don't just come back to life to mess things up. That led to some things being out a sync a bit after revival.
Anyway, we worked all weekend. We had standby hosts to revive or replace and a lot of cleanup to do to damaged databases that we had to prioritize.
When we walked in the office door on Monday, the office staff stood up and gave us a standing ovation.
As someone who helped bring a data center online, I don't understand ANY of this. We had redundant EVERYTHING except main power feeds (because of local zoning). Even redundant ISP's and physical drops. We tested our generators and our UPS's and cooling towers monthly. I don't get it. A colo facility that even HAS an "edge case" scenario is not one I'd trust a million dollar a year business to.
It sounds to me like the system that cuts everything out to prevent loss due to water damage kicked in. The one where "welp it's better to shut down unexpectedly rather than short out" comes into play. Basically where you don't WANT backup power to kick in.
Wait. Where's the comment that there was a flood? I've been reading and hadn't seen that.
And why would a flood at a single facility take out BOTH the NA and EU "megaservers?" That doesn't make sense.
And "my" data center was purposely built higher than the 100-year flood plain. :-D
They posted that the system that kicks in to totally knock out power in case of fire or flood is what kicked in. I don't think there was an actual flood. More a problem with the buildings emergency systems.
Weird. My datacenter had no such system. I don't think we could have purposely cut all power and prevented the backup systems from taking over if we tried.
Also, it still doesn't explain how ALL servers are impacted, in what we PRESUME are completely different locations and data centers.
galbreath34b14_ESO wrote: »I'm gonna go out on a limb and say that over 6 hours into a complete shutdown that having the idiotic "All Systems Operational" message saying all servers up is going to have long term trust erosion with players.
dk_dunkirk wrote: »
Wait. Where's the comment that there was a flood? I've been reading and hadn't seen that.
And why would a flood at a single facility take out BOTH the NA and EU "megaservers?" That doesn't make sense.
And "my" data center was purposely built higher than the 100-year flood plain. :-D
There wasn't a flood, but sometimes there can be false positives that trigger something.
At the high school I went to, the fire alarm system was designed so that as soon as the building's sprinkler system comes on, it triggers the fire alarms/evacuation system. Unfortunately, one particular day my freshman year, a water pressure error caused the fire evacuation/alarm system to sound, even though there was no fire.
By the same token, on another lovely day in the same year, when a custodian accidentally dropped a bunch of insulation material in a storage closet, the dust from that material got into the smoke detector and reacted the same way that it would if actual smoke reached the detector - it sounded, and the fire alarm/evacuation system activates.
I could provide other examples and go on for a while, but you get the gist - just because there is no fire/flood doesn't mean the failsafes that trigger when a fire/flood happens won't accidentally activate - no system is foolproof/perfect.
And if I told you uno times, I told you a thousand uno times - the power outage took out NA megaserver and login server servicing both NA/EU megaservers. EU players could keep playing if they want to, as long as they were already in-game and don't log out (though not sure anyone is still online by now).
dk_dunkirk wrote: »dk_dunkirk wrote: »dk_dunkirk wrote: »Hi,
I'm a Linux Systems Engineer, by profession, and I have been through a colo-wide Emergency Power Off event in my time.
Let me tell you, it's not as simple as just turning stuff back on...
- Our colocation center ITSELF was supposed to be our UPS. There's no UPS. If the colo goes out, that's it.
- when power was cutoff, it didn't take us long to figure out that the colo.. disappeared. We basically clown-car'd over to the datacenter and we were there for a long time. The power failure had occured in the early evening, on a Friday, and we spent all night there. We were 5 staff members that rushed over.
- when the power came back, ALL of the machines all tried to POST and boot at the same time. I don't know if you've ever heard servers, but their fans scream and everything goes full power for a sec. There was a brownout and 2/3 of the hosts were stuck in POST, frozen. Someone had to go around with a crashcart/KVM to check on its health and force a powercycle. 1 host at a time. There can be a LOT of hosts in a colo.
- our disaster recovery plan never had a 'cold start' plan prepared and we had to make one up on the fly. The switches will just power on and everything needs to be up. Storage, Database, and caching hosts first. Tools and things that talk to storage hosts next. (workhorse hosts, website). Once that's up and healthy, Proxies come up next, opening the floodgates to services.
- many the database hosts had corrupted tables that needed SQL table repair after boot. I saw in another thread that there are indeed MySQL hosts involved, so they have my sympathy there. *1000 yards stare*
- Some hosts were DOA and wouldnt even power on. Sometimes it was a standby of a given role, so we just let them stay dead till we had time for a replacement. Others were Primaries, and we had to force emergency failovers and make sure the old dead primaries stayed dead and don't just come back to life to mess things up. That led to some things being out a sync a bit after revival.
Anyway, we worked all weekend. We had standby hosts to revive or replace and a lot of cleanup to do to damaged databases that we had to prioritize.
When we walked in the office door on Monday, the office staff stood up and gave us a standing ovation.
As someone who helped bring a data center online, I don't understand ANY of this. We had redundant EVERYTHING except main power feeds (because of local zoning). Even redundant ISP's and physical drops. We tested our generators and our UPS's and cooling towers monthly. I don't get it. A colo facility that even HAS an "edge case" scenario is not one I'd trust a million dollar a year business to.
It sounds to me like the system that cuts everything out to prevent loss due to water damage kicked in. The one where "welp it's better to shut down unexpectedly rather than short out" comes into play. Basically where you don't WANT backup power to kick in.
Wait. Where's the comment that there was a flood? I've been reading and hadn't seen that.
And why would a flood at a single facility take out BOTH the NA and EU "megaservers?" That doesn't make sense.
And "my" data center was purposely built higher than the 100-year flood plain. :-D
They posted that the system that kicks in to totally knock out power in case of fire or flood is what kicked in. I don't think there was an actual flood. More a problem with the buildings emergency systems.
Weird. My datacenter had no such system. I don't think we could have purposely cut all power and prevented the backup systems from taking over if we tried.
Also, it still doesn't explain how ALL servers are impacted, in what we PRESUME are completely different locations and data centers.
dk_dunkirk wrote: »dk_dunkirk wrote: »
Wait. Where's the comment that there was a flood? I've been reading and hadn't seen that.
And why would a flood at a single facility take out BOTH the NA and EU "megaservers?" That doesn't make sense.
And "my" data center was purposely built higher than the 100-year flood plain. :-D
There wasn't a flood, but sometimes there can be false positives that trigger something.
At the high school I went to, the fire alarm system was designed so that as soon as the building's sprinkler system comes on, it triggers the fire alarms/evacuation system. Unfortunately, one particular day my freshman year, a water pressure error caused the fire evacuation/alarm system to sound, even though there was no fire.
By the same token, on another lovely day in the same year, when a custodian accidentally dropped a bunch of insulation material in a storage closet, the dust from that material got into the smoke detector and reacted the same way that it would if actual smoke reached the detector - it sounded, and the fire alarm/evacuation system activates.
I could provide other examples and go on for a while, but you get the gist - just because there is no fire/flood doesn't mean the failsafes that trigger when a fire/flood happens won't accidentally activate - no system is foolproof/perfect.
And if I told you uno times, I told you a thousand uno times - the power outage took out NA megaserver and login server servicing both NA/EU megaservers. EU players could keep playing if they want to, as long as they were already in-game and don't log out (though not sure anyone is still online by now).
Well that's a poorly designed data center. I guess our subscription money and Crown store purchases can only afford so much.
And thank you for the explanation about the login server.
dk_dunkirk wrote: »dk_dunkirk wrote: »
Wait. Where's the comment that there was a flood? I've been reading and hadn't seen that.
And why would a flood at a single facility take out BOTH the NA and EU "megaservers?" That doesn't make sense.
And "my" data center was purposely built higher than the 100-year flood plain. :-D
There wasn't a flood, but sometimes there can be false positives that trigger something.
At the high school I went to, the fire alarm system was designed so that as soon as the building's sprinkler system comes on, it triggers the fire alarms/evacuation system. Unfortunately, one particular day my freshman year, a water pressure error caused the fire evacuation/alarm system to sound, even though there was no fire.
By the same token, on another lovely day in the same year, when a custodian accidentally dropped a bunch of insulation material in a storage closet, the dust from that material got into the smoke detector and reacted the same way that it would if actual smoke reached the detector - it sounded, and the fire alarm/evacuation system activates.
I could provide other examples and go on for a while, but you get the gist - just because there is no fire/flood doesn't mean the failsafes that trigger when a fire/flood happens won't accidentally activate - no system is foolproof/perfect.
And if I told you uno times, I told you a thousand uno times - the power outage took out NA megaserver and login server servicing both NA/EU megaservers. EU players could keep playing if they want to, as long as they were already in-game and don't log out (though not sure anyone is still online by now).
Well that's a poorly designed data center. I guess our subscription money and Crown store purchases can only afford so much.
And thank you for the explanation about the login server.
dk_dunkirk wrote: »dk_dunkirk wrote: »dk_dunkirk wrote: »
Wait. Where's the comment that there was a flood? I've been reading and hadn't seen that.
And why would a flood at a single facility take out BOTH the NA and EU "megaservers?" That doesn't make sense.
And "my" data center was purposely built higher than the 100-year flood plain. :-D
There wasn't a flood, but sometimes there can be false positives that trigger something.
At the high school I went to, the fire alarm system was designed so that as soon as the building's sprinkler system comes on, it triggers the fire alarms/evacuation system. Unfortunately, one particular day my freshman year, a water pressure error caused the fire evacuation/alarm system to sound, even though there was no fire.
By the same token, on another lovely day in the same year, when a custodian accidentally dropped a bunch of insulation material in a storage closet, the dust from that material got into the smoke detector and reacted the same way that it would if actual smoke reached the detector - it sounded, and the fire alarm/evacuation system activates.
I could provide other examples and go on for a while, but you get the gist - just because there is no fire/flood doesn't mean the failsafes that trigger when a fire/flood happens won't accidentally activate - no system is foolproof/perfect.
And if I told you uno times, I told you a thousand uno times - the power outage took out NA megaserver and login server servicing both NA/EU megaservers. EU players could keep playing if they want to, as long as they were already in-game and don't log out (though not sure anyone is still online by now).
Well that's a poorly designed data center. I guess our subscription money and Crown store purchases can only afford so much.
And thank you for the explanation about the login server.
Scratch that, I guess ESO's much-vaunted TWO BILLION DOLLARS of revenue can only afford so much.
dk_dunkirk wrote: »dk_dunkirk wrote: »
Wait. Where's the comment that there was a flood? I've been reading and hadn't seen that.
And why would a flood at a single facility take out BOTH the NA and EU "megaservers?" That doesn't make sense.
And "my" data center was purposely built higher than the 100-year flood plain. :-D
There wasn't a flood, but sometimes there can be false positives that trigger something.
At the high school I went to, the fire alarm system was designed so that as soon as the building's sprinkler system comes on, it triggers the fire alarms/evacuation system. Unfortunately, one particular day my freshman year, a water pressure error caused the fire evacuation/alarm system to sound, even though there was no fire.
By the same token, on another lovely day in the same year, when a custodian accidentally dropped a bunch of insulation material in a storage closet, the dust from that material got into the smoke detector and reacted the same way that it would if actual smoke reached the detector - it sounded, and the fire alarm/evacuation system activates.
I could provide other examples and go on for a while, but you get the gist - just because there is no fire/flood doesn't mean the failsafes that trigger when a fire/flood happens won't accidentally activate - no system is foolproof/perfect.
And if I told you uno times, I told you a thousand uno times - the power outage took out NA megaserver and login server servicing both NA/EU megaservers. EU players could keep playing if they want to, as long as they were already in-game and don't log out (though not sure anyone is still online by now).
Well that's a poorly designed data center. I guess our subscription money and Crown store purchases can only afford so much.
And thank you for the explanation about the login server.
It's actually a pretty standard design, because when that system kicks in appropriately it can save the business a lot of time and money. It's just if it kicks in at the wrong time that it's a problem.
I remember one time our fire system cut in when a contractor was heat sealing a linoleum repair or something along those lines in a particularly narrow hallway. Tripped the heat sensor.
ArchangelIsraphel wrote: »It's also the point at which even more dishes seem to suddenly manifest in the sink out of no-where.
How do you know so accurately what happens in my home? That's almost scary!